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CASE COMMENTS

fixing in the milk industry violates the right of the individual's freedom of contract which is protected by both the federal and state
constitutions. The court, in overruling prior decisions sustaining
the validity of the price fixing statute, held that the legislature can
only fix prices where business is "affected with a public interest."
The milk industry, according to the court, is not so affected.
Both the Georgia case and the case under comment represent
the minority view. For the most part the courts seem inclined to
follow the Nebbia case, which is the law today at least so far as
an interpretation of federal due process is concerned. Mr. Justice
McReynolds, speaking for the minority in the Nebbia case, expressed the fear that by allowing the fixing of milk prices, price
control would extend to other goods. Nebbia v. New York, supra
at 551. However, since that decision over twenty-five years ago,
there have been relatively few extensions of price fixing to other
goods and services. That courts are going to be cautious in extending the doctrine is shown by two fairly recent cases. In State
Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal.2d 436, 254
P.2d 29 (1953), the court held unconstitutional a statute authorizing
the fixing of minimum prices for dry cleaning. In Edwards v. State
Bd. of Barber Examiners, 72 Ariz. 108, 231 ,P.2d 450 (1951),
a state law fixing minimum prices for barbering services was declared -invalid. These statutes were held to be beyond the scope
of the police power as their purpose was not primarily the promotion of public welfare.
Nevertheless, the fixing of prices is not in itself unconstitutional.
The test, as stated previously, is whether a statute allowing price
control, has as its purpose a legitimate end, and seeks to attain
such end in a reasonable manner. If it meets these requirements
it should not be violative of due process.
Peter Uriah Hook

Contracts - Conditions - Restraint of Remarriage
P's brothers entered into a contract with D in which D promised
to pay royalties (on the sale of corn husking machines) to P's
mother during her life and upon her death to pay like royalties to
P "provided she shall not have theretofore remarried; such royalties to be paid to her until her death or remarriage." P remarried
in 1944 and her mother died in 1945. P alleges that the condition
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in restraint of remarriage is void and seeks specific performance of
the contract and an accounting. The district court granted specific
performance of the contract. Held, in affirming the lower court,
that the condition -in the contract was a condition subsequent, and
that under Illinois law a condition in restraint of remarriage is void.
Shackleton v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 279 F.2d 919 (7th

Cir. 1960).
Jurisdiction in this cause rests on diversity of citizenship and
the law of Illinois is determinative of substantive rights. Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Before discussing the status of the condition in the instant
case, it is necessary to discuss conditions as applied to contracts
in general. In contract law, conditions precedent qualify or limit
the duty of immediate performance. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
666 (rev. ed. 1936). In other words, a condition precedent is a
fact, (other than mere lapse of time), which must exist or occur
before a duty of immediate performance of a promise arises. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 250 (1932). West Virginia is in accord with this definition. W. VA. ANNOT., RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 250 (1938).
If A and B enter into a contract in which A promises to buy
B's horse if it wins the derby, A has made the winning of the derby
a condition precedent to his duty to pay for the horse. There is
no duty of immediate performance of a conditional promise until
the condition occurs. 12 AM. JUR. CONTRACTS § 328 (1938).
In the law of contracts the term condition subsequent means
subsequent to a duty of immediate performance, that is, a condition which does not require further performance of the immediate
duty which has once accrued under the contract. 3 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 667 (rev. ed. 1936), cited with approval in Hoffman
v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp., 146 Ore. 66, 29 P.2d 557 (1934).

In other words, a fact which unless excused will extinguish a duty
to make compensation for breach of contract after the breach has
occurred, is a condition subsequent.

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §

250 (1932).
Thus, a condition in a fire insurance policy which provides
that after proof of loss a suit must be brought within twelve months
is a true condition subsequent. Without a discussion as to when
the twelve-month period begins to run, the courts hold that failure
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of the insured to bring his suit within twelve months absolves the
insurer of all liability under the policy. In Kirk v. Fireman's Ins.
Co., 107 W. Va. 666, 150 S.E. 2 (1929) this situation was before
the court and was treated as a condition subsequent although not
so denominated. In contract law it is difficult to find an example
of a condition subsequent because, as is stated in 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 667 (rev. ed. 1936), "Such conditions are very rare."
One problem arises because many conditions which are precedent in effect are stated in subsequent form. In fire insurance
policies it is stated that if notice, or proof of loss, is not given
within thirty days the policy is void. This condition although
stated in subsequent form is in reality and effect a condition precedent. Proof of loss must be presented by the insured before there
is an immediate duty on the part of the insurer to pay the indemnity provided for in the policy. Morris v. Dutchess Ins. Co.,
67 W. Va. 368, 68 S.E. 22 (1910). This was also held to be true
in relation to a waiver of premium clause because of disability,
in a life insurance policy. The court stated that proof of disability
was a condition precedent to the duty of the insurer to waive the
premium. Iannarelli v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 88,
171 S.E. 748 (1933). The classic example in this area is Gray v.
Gardner, 17 Mass. 188 (1821), in which A in a sealed writing
promised to pay B $1,000. The writing continued: "this obligation shall be void if the ship 'Lady Adams' arrives by October 1."
The failure of the ship to arrive by October 1 is a condition precedent to A's duty of immediate performance. There can be no right
of action before that day. 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 741 (1960),
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS

§ 259 (1932).

In order to determine whether a condition is precedent or
subsequent some courts erroneously state that this will be determined
merely by the intent of the parties or the intent that can be implied from looking at the contract as a whole. This was the view
taken in the instant case when it was in the lower court. Shackleton v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 166 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Ill.
1958). The circuit court accepted this view without discussion.
Many other courts take this same view. This result is reached
by the failure to distinguish between a condition which relates to
the formation of the contract and one which relates to the duty
of performance. It may also, in some instances, be the result of
confusing contract law with property law. In Mereminsky v. Mere-
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minsky, 188 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1959), the court seems to have failed
to make this distinction and used the intent of the parties to determine whether a condition was precedent or subsequent.
By another view, mere intent is not enough to create a condition subsequent. The duty of immediate performance must be
looked at to determine whether a condition be precedent or subsequent. A condition subsequent under this view cannot be considered as such unless the fact is an occurrence that can consistently
within the terms of the promise take place after a duty of immediate performance has arisen, and an intention is clearly manifested that the occurrence shall be a condition subsequent. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 259 (1932). This seems to be the
better view and West Virginia seems to be in accord. W. VA. ANNOT., RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 250, 259 (1938).
To determine in the instant case whether the condition was
precedent or subsequent, it is necessary to analyze the contract
step by step. The contract was entered into by D and P's brothers.
The contract was for the sale of a corporation, owned by P's brothers,
in exchange for an undisclosed consideration and a promise by Ds
to pay certain stipulated royalties to a donee beneficiary. The
beneficiary was P's mother until her death and then P, if she had
not theretofore remarried, until her death or remarriage. This
was a gift by P's brothers to their mother and to P. The condition
was in no way related to the formation of the contract but related
solely to the duty of performance.
In this case the lower court used the intent theory to determine whether the condition was precedent or subsequent. This
is not the better view. D promised to pay P after her mother died,
as long as she did not remarry. The promise of D then was, in
effect, to pay P if she remained unmarried. This condition is not
a condition subsequent. The fact, (the marriage), is not an occurrence that can consistently with the terms of the promise, (D
promises to pay royalties to P if she remains unmarried), take
place after the duty of immediate performance has arisen. This
condition is therefore plainly a condition precedent stated in the
form of a condition subsequent. So the condition precedent is a
fact, (the unmarried state), which must exist or occur before a
duty to perform the promise, (D's promise to pay royalties to P if
she remains in an unmarried state), arises. In other words, P's
remaining in an unmarried state is a condition precedent to D's
duty to make the royalty payments. There is no duty of immediate
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performance of a conditional promise on the part of D until the
condition is complied with. 12 AM. JuR. CONTRACTS § 328 (1938).
Since the condition in the instant case was held to be a void
condition, (which will be discussed subsequently), the question
then arises as to what is the legal effect of a void condition precedent
in a contract. If a condition in a contract is in unlawful restraint
of marriage and the promise is open to the same objection no obligation ever arises. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1741 (rev. ed.
1938). Also if a contract is conditional or illegal, the rights of
a donee beneficiary are subject to the same limitations. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 364A (rev. ed. 1936), RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 140 (1932).
Therefore it seems that if the condition in
the instant case was illegal and void the P has no right under the
contract. This is not the position that was taken in the instant
case, where the court held that the P was entitled to the royalties
provided for her in the contract. The court seems to apply rules
of property law, although there was no discussion of this, which
do not apply in contracts. The legal consequences of a void condition in a deed or will, in contrast to a void condition in a contract, are very different. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1741 (rev.
ed. 1938).
Before discussing the validity of restraints on marriage it
must be noted that "the same considerations of public policy which
invalidate conditions in restraint of marriage in deeds or wills apply
when the restraint is imposed by contract." ANNOT., 122 A.L.R.
7, 127 (1939).
Since restraints on marriage are governed by public policy,
various rules have been adopted. One rule with which all courts
seem to be in accord is that there can be no valid contract or
condition which is in perpetual restraint of marriage upon one who
has not previously married. Public policy renders this restraint
illegal and therefore void. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 233 (1939), 6
WILLISTON,

CONTRACTS §

CONTRACTS

§ 581 (1932).

1741 (rev. ed. 1938),

RESTATEMENT,

To this general rule many exceptions have been made, resulting in some confusion. The only exception which will be considered here is that concerning contracts and conditions in restraint
of a second marriage. Here, there is a conflict of authority. The
majority view is that a condition in restraint of remarriageis a valid
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condition. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 233 (1939). The instant case
holds that a condition in restraint of remarriage is void unless it
is placed upon a widow by her deceased husband. This position
was criticized in the dissenting opinion, which argued that the majority of the court had arrived at its decision by the use of obiter
dicta in two previous Illinois cases. Assuming that this case represents the Illinois view, it is decidedly a minority view.
The majority view has been criticized by some courts, which
state that there is no logical reason why a restraint on marriage
should be treated differently, whether it be a first, second, or third
marriage. These courts contend that it is still against public policy
to restrain one's free choice of a mate. ANNOT., 122 A.L.R. 7
(1939).
Although the majority view has been criticized, it seems to be
supported by a logical foundation. "This foundation seems to be
that in such a case the donor does not ordinarily impose the restraint
out of caprice, but for the purpose of providing support while it
is needed .....
" 35 AM. JUR. Marriage § 262 (1941).
The
majority view seems to be the better view and it is supported by

the weight of authority in the United States. 2 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 933 at 1962 (4th ed. 1918), 35 AM. JUR. Marriage § 262 (1941).
In West Virginia there seems to be no case construing contracts in restraint of marriage. In respect to conditions in a deed
or will just one case has been found, and this concerns a condition
precedent in a will. The will contained a bequest which was conditional upon the legatee remaining unmarried until she became
twenty one years of age, and the court held that this was not
such a restraint on marriage as to make the condition void. Reuff
v. Coleman, 30 W. Va. 171 (1887). In light of the liberal position taken in this case, it seems that West Virginia would follow
the majority view and not declare a condition in restraint of second
marriage illegal and void.

William Warren Upton
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